level might be appropriate for a given situation, and what might be required to achieve it.
T he EEMUA Publication 1911 has been recognised by many practitioners as representing industry best practice on alarm management. However, one area in which it is weak is on guidance as to what constitutes an The EEMUA 191 Reference Point appropriate performance target for a given alarm system, that represents a reasonable aspiration reflecting the In the quest to raise the level of alarm system performunique situation of each plant. Many users have identified ance, the EEMUA )91 document has been widely recogthe reference point (per operator) of 'one alarm per ten nised as representing industry best practice. It describes minutes on average, ten alarms in ten minutes following a many practical tools and techniques, together with sugplant upset' as being a universal threshold of acceptabili-gested criteria for judging the results. With regard to ty. However, practical experience suggests that for some alarm system performance during 'steady' operation, plants this is a highly challenging aspiration, possibly EEMUA 191 contains the criteria listed in Figure 1 . even unachievable with current technology. Assuming For performance following a major plant upset the crithat these plants are staffed with an adequate number of teria listed in Figure 2 are indicated. operators, as confirmed by a wide range of other benchThese targets are derived from human factors princimarks, is this target therefore always appropriate? Should pIes, but make broad assumptions about the role of the alarm management improvement projects commit them-'typical' operator of industrial plant to which they are selves to a target that they know that they cannot reason-applied. In a situation where an operator is very heavily ably hope to achieve, in other words, setting themselves loaded with a wide range of tasks other than monitoring up to fail? If they do pursue the EEMUA 191 reference the plant through the control system interface, these target inappropriately, wiJI the resources required be out thresholds of acceptability might even not be aggressive of balance with the value -such that the same effort spent enough. On the other hand, there may be circumstances elsewhere could have achieved greater improvements, where they are overly conservative. including leverage on plant safety?
In the absence of further guidance within EEMUA 191, This paper defines a set of three metrics for alarm sys-many users have adopted the reference point of 'one terns, based on EEMUA 191 principles, and proposes a alarm per ten minutes on average, ten alarms in ten minstructure of five typical performance levels. This is use-utes following a plant upset' as being a universal threshful because it allows a discussion of what performance old of acceptability. In order to differentiate a range of performance levels for an alarm system, it is first necessary to define more closely a set of quantitative metrics. A set of three have been chosen as useful, although they are not fully independent of each other. These can be calculated from alarm journals, either historised on the control system or captured on a separate archive Pc. Ideally purpose-built software should be used to analyse the alarm history, but if necessary a simple Excel spreadsheet (or Access database) can be written (or adapted) to meet this need. The metrics, defined as a figure per operator, are as follows:
Normally expressed as a figure per hour, the total number of alarms which were annunciated to the operator (ie excluding events sent to the journal only) during the period of the analysis, divided by the total number of hours covered by the data. This is a simple measure of the average level of interruption imposed on the operator by the Alarm System. In practice, the calculation needs to take into account periods in the data set where the alarm history was unavailable.
* Maximum alarm rate
Normally expressed as a figure per hour, this is the worst-case load during any ten minute period. It is calculated by splitting the alarm journal into consecutive ten minute time-slices, and calculating the worst-case number of alarms which were annunciated to the operator (ie excluding events sent to the journal only) during any of the ten minute periods, multiplied by 6 to give a figure per hour. If the analysis is performed with hourly time-slices the resulting figure is likely to be significantly lower.
* Percentage of hours when there were more than 30 alarms per hour
This is a simple measure of the proportion of the time that the Alarm System was 'upset'. It is calculated by splitting the alarm journal into consecutive one hour time-slices, and calculating the number of alarms which Feature + were annunciated to the operator (ie excluding events sent to the journal only) during any of these periods. The proportion of periods where the load exceeded 30 alarms, judged to be a reasonable level of manageability (1 alarm per 2 mins), is normally expressed as a percentage. In practice, the calculation needs to take into account periods in the data set where the alarm history was unavailable. These three metrics are chosen not only because they characterise the Alarm System performance in a powerful manner, but also because they are simple to calculate and can be generated autonomously by a programme running in batch mode -to track the on-going performance of the Alarm System.
Alarm System Performance Levels
Because the quantitative metrics are expressed in absolute numbers (eg of alarms per hour) per operator, they can be used to compare directly the performance of alarm systems from different sites. Data from a range of industrial plant around the world suggests that the performance of alarm systems is spread across four orders of magnitude. Within this space it is possible to identify five typical cells, as shown in Figure 3 , plotting average alarm rate against 10-minute burst rate.
An important characteristic of Figure. 3 is that the upper left half of the area is impossible -the average rate cannot exceed the maximum. The grid system, plotted on a logarithmic scale, is aligned around the EEMUA 191 reference point, as denoted with the 'X'. Five cells have been identified because they have been found in practice to contain a high proportion of the data from real plants, and have been labelled with a description appropriate to an alarm system at that level of performance. This sequence of five performance levels represents a typical 'journey' from poor performance (top right, containing alarm systems that can be described as 'overloaded') to best in class (bottom left, containing alarm systems that can be described as 'predictive'). On this 'journey' the easiest to impact is the average alarm rate, whilst the burst rate is more intractable and can only be addressed once the basics have been fixed. 
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The full definition of the proposed performance levels is contained in Figure 4 , using all three metrics. For the alarm system on a given plant, assuming that a range of other benchmarks (such as the nwnber of control valves per operator, and the amount and complexity of equipment under the control of each operator) confinn that the operators are sufficient in' number, it is important to question what would be a relevant target performance level. The following descriptions explore this in more detail:
• Level 1: Overloaded At this level the Alarm System is subject to a continuously high rate of alarms, and deteriorates rapidly during process upset. This is occasionally still found in newlycommissioned installations with DCS systems, but may be acceptable if:
• There are no significant implications if the operator ignores the Alarm System for long periods; • There is insufficient potential benefit (economic, safety or envirorunentaJ) to justify any improvement effort.
The best solution for a situation where this performance level is appropriate might be to provide the operators with a switch to block all alarm annunciation when their focus needs to be elsewhere.
• Level 2: Reactive This could be considered the mioirnwn 'entry level' for most pJants. It is typically representative of a new DCS that has been implemented with the minimum best practices, or an existing system that has received some initial attention -particularly with regard to the 'bad actors', those few alarms that contribute consistently with no real meaning. Some improvement has been made for the average alarm rate, by comparison with Level 1, but the peak rate during upset is still unmanageable and the Alarm System will continue to represent an unhelpful distraction to the operator for long periods.
• Level 3: Stable Typically by careful selection of which variables to alarm either via a rationalisation exercise or via rational selection of alarms up-front during a project phase, improvements have now been made to both the average alarm and peak alarm rates, by comparison with Level 2. Problems due to 'bad actors' have been kept under control by regular review and continuous improvement, but there still remains a problem with the burst aJarm rate. In general the aJarms have been well defined for normal operation, but the system is less useful during plant upset. Possibly at the limit of what is achievable with commercially available technology, this level of performance represents a realisable aspiration for most plants today. Both the average and the peak alarm rates are under control, the latter under the full range of foreseeable plant operating scenarios. The use of dynamic techniques to improve the real time performance of the Alarm System is likely to be extensive.
• Level 5: Predictive
This level of performan~eetsthe aspirational targets set in EEMUA Publication 191, but for many plants may not be achievable today with commercially available technology; even when achievable, it may not be justified for all plants. In many cases it will require fully adaptive alarming, whereby the Alarm System predicts the future state of the plant and adjusts its configuration to meet the needs of the moment, to achieve breakthrough performance on both the average and the peak alarm rate. This is typically the domain of research and development activity, and is likely to be an important step in achieving paradigm shift towards remote manning and the facilities models of the future.
Which Performance Level Is Appropriate?
The performance level that is appropriate as a target for an individual alarm system depends on a range of factors, including:
• The range of tasks performed by the Control Room Operator
In some cases this role is restricted to management of the process, using the DCS and its Alarm System -with no requirement to leave the control room. In other cases, however, the Control Room Operator may also be responsible for coordinating traffic (eg marine, aviation) around the plant, managing communications (eg radio, tannoy), authorising work activities and even touring the plant to take local measurements and performing manual operations. Where the operator's role is more focused (the former case), the absolute performance level that is appropriate is likely to be lower, since (simplistically) the operator can afford to spend a larger proportion of time interacting with the Alarm System. .
* Complexity
It is likely that increased complexity will drive a need for higher levels of Alarm System performance. Simplistically, if it takes the Operator longer to understand the implications and correct response to each alarm then in any period of time he/she can afford to receive fewer of them -and still remain on top of the situation.
• The consequences of failure to act For all assets there are a range of severities associated with the Operator failing to respond to an alarm, as characterised by the prioritisation of the alarm. Application of standards such as lEC 61508 and underlying risk criteria will tend to normalise these between assets, but in some cases, particularly on older plants or unusual processes, there may be a greater reliance on operator action in response to alarms in order to avoid significant hazards.
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In such cases it is clear that a higher perfonnance level for the Alarm System would be appropriate.
* The required speed of response
As with the consequences of failure to act (see above), there is also a range of timescales on which the Operator has to react in order to avoid the consequences of missing the alarm altogether. Some assets will have generally faster process dynamics than others (for example due to process instability, exothermic reactions, high gas velocity processes) and in these cases a higher perfonnance level for the Alarm System would also be appropriate.
* 'Centrality' of alarmed plant
Even where the consequence of failure to act is a safe shutdown of the plant, the relationship of alarmed plant to connected plants (with separate Alarm Systems) may also be important. The shutdown of a water treatment facility may be relatively tolerable for a short period because of buffer storage capacity, whereas the loss, even temporary, of a core process unit (such as an ethylene cracker) may have altogether wider implications in terms of impact on associated units, as well as a higher corrunercial penalty. The performance level of the Alarm System on the latter would be expected to be higher than fOT the fonner.
* Level of automation and fallback strategies
Plants with a higher level of automation will typically require less manual intervention, and could therefore potentially get by with an Alarm System exhibiting a lower performance level. However what is probably more important is the abruptness of the transition to lower fallback controls when these higher levels of automation fail for some reason. If the transition is abrupt (ie nothing between full multivariable predictive control and direct manipulation of valve positions) then a higher Alarm System performance level would be indicated (ie the Alarm System actually has to be designed to be usable at the lower level of automation).
* The cost of implementing higher performance levels Particularly for plants with an older DeS, the cost of improving the Alarm System performance level may be very high or the task may even be impractical. In these Feature + cases, provided the appropriate risk criteria are met, investments elsewhere to improve plant performance may deliver greater value (economic, safety and environmental) than efforts to raise the Alarm System to a higher performance level.
In theory the choice of performance level is independent of plant size and the number of operators. This is because the definition of each level in this vision is based on quantitative metrics that are expressed in absolute numbers (eg of alanns per hour) per operator. The implication of a larger plant scope under the control of each operator (measured, for example, by the number of control loops) is that more effort will have to be put into the Alarm System to achieve a given performance level.
The choice of which Alarm System performance level is appropriate will vary between assets, but as a general rule higher Alarm System performance levels will deliver higher plant availability and safety.
Conclusions
Practical experience from a range of plant around the world suggests that the EEMUA 191 reference point of 'one alarm per ten minutes on average, ten alarms in ten minutes following a plant upset'. as adopted by many users in the absence of further guidance, may not be appropriate as a universal threshold of acceptability. Instead a structure of five perfonnance levels is proposed, based on three clearlydefined and easily-calculated metrics. A number of criteria are suggested to support a discussion ofwhat target performance level may be appropriate in a given situation, which can then be adopted as a realistic goal for an alarm management improvement project.
